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S P E C I A L  E D U C A T I O N
When Does the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act Permit 
Tuition Reimbursement?
by Jay E. Grenig
The Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act
is a federal law intended
to ensure that all 
children with disabilities
have access to a free and
appropriate education.
This case asks the 
Court to clarify the 
circumstances in which
parents who believe their
special-needs children
cannot obtain such an
education in the public
schools may be 
reimbursed for their 
private-school tuition
payments.
Jay E. Grenig is a professor of law
at Marquette University Law
School in Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
and a co-author of Electronic
Discovery and Records
Management Guide. He can be
reached at jgrenig@earthlink.net 
or (414) 288-5377.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF
NEW YORK V. TOM F. EX REL.
GILBERT F.
DOCKET NO. 06-637
ARGUMENT DATE: 
OCTOBER 1, 2007
FROM: THE SECOND CIRCUIT
ISSUE
Do the 1997 amendments to the
Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA) categorically
bar children who have not previous-
ly attended a public school from
receiving tuition reimbursement for
the cost of private schooling?
FACTS
Gilbert F. has attended a private
school since kindergarten. On June
23, 1999, a Committee on Special
Education (CSE) of the New York
City Board of Education conducted
an annual review to determine
Gilbert’s appropriate educational
placement for the 1999–2000 school
year. The CSE recommended that
Gilbert continue to be classified as
learning disabled, and that he be
placed in a Modified Instructional
Services I program with a student-
teacher ratio of 15:1. The CSE also
recommended that Gilbert receive
speech/language therapy in a group
twice a week and counseling in a
group once a week. Gilbert’s Final
Notice of Recommendation was sent
to Gilbert’s father on July 29, 1999.
The Recommendation placed
Gilbert at P.S. 871, a public school.
Gilbert’s father continued Gilbert’s
placement at the private school for
the 1999–2000 school year and
requested an impartial hearing,
seeking reimbursement for the cost
of Gilbert’s tuition. In April 2000, an
Impartial Hearing Officer found the
proposed placement of Gilbert in
P.S. 871 was inappropriate for
Gilbert’s needs and ordered the
school board to reimburse Gilbert’s
father for the cost of the Gilbert’s
tuition at the private school. 
The school board appealed to the
State Education Department State
Review Officer. The State Review
Officer affirmed the hearing officer’s
decision awarding tuition reim-
bursement on the grounds that the
CSE had not been properly consti-
tuted, resulting in Gilbert’s inappro-
priate placement. 
The school board filed suit in feder-
al court seeking a reversal of the
State Review Officer’s decision. The
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school board contended that the
decision granting tuition reimburse-
ment was in violation of a provision
in the IDEA precluding an award of
tuition reimbursement when a stu-
dent has not previously received
special education services from a
public agency, and it argued that the
CSE was properly constituted. The
district court granted the school
board’s motion for summary judg-
ment reversing the State Education
Department’s grant of tuition reim-
bursement on the grounds that the
IDEA bars tuition reimbursement. 
Gilbert’s father sought review by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. The Second Circuit
reversed the district court and
returned the case for further pro-
ceedings in light of the Second
Circuit’s decision in Frank G. v.
Board of Education of Hyde Park,
459 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 2006). 193
Fed. Appx. 26 (2d Cir. 2006).
The school board then sought
review by the U.S. Supreme Court
of the Second Circuit’s decision.
The Supreme Court granted the
District’s petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari. 127 S.Ct. 1393 (2007).
CASE ANALYSIS
The IDEA (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.)
seeks to ensure that all disabled
children have available to them a
free appropriate public education.
While the IDEA does not require
states to maximize the potential of
disabled children, it must provide
such children with meaningful
access to education. A free appro-
priate public education under the
IDEA must include special educa-
tion and related services tailored to
meet the unique needs of a particu-
lar child and be reasonably calculat-
ed to enable the child to receive
educational benefits. 
The key element of the IDEA is
development of an individualized
education program for each disabled
child, including a comprehensive
statement of the educational needs
of the disabled child and the spe-
cially designed instruction and relat-
ed services to be employed to meet
those needs. In developing a child’s
individualized education program, a
Committee on Special Education is
required to consider four factors:
(1) academic achievement and
learning characteristics, (2) social
development, (3) physical develop-
ment, and (4) managerial or behav-
ioral needs. 
If a state fails in its obligation under
the IDEA to provide a free appropri-
ate public education to a disabled
child, the parents may enroll the
child in a private school and seek
retroactive reimbursement from the
state for the cost of the private
school.
A two-pronged test is used to deter-
mine whether parents are entitled
to reimbursement for the cost of
private schooling under the IDEA.
The test asks (1) whether the indi-
vidualized education program pro-
posed by the school district was
inappropriate, and (2) whether the
private placement was appropriate
to the child’s needs. 
Even after establishing that a pro-
posed individualized education pro-
gram would be inappropriate, par-
ents seeking reimbursement under
the IDEA for a private school place-
ment still bear the burden of
demonstrating that the private
placement is appropriate. Parents
are not, however, required to show
that a private placement furnishes
every special service necessary to
maximize their child’s potential;
they need only demonstrate that the
placement provides educational
instruction specially designed to
meet the unique needs of a disabled
child, supported by such services as
are necessary to permit the child to
benefit from instruction. 
With respect to tuition reimburse-
ment, 1997 amendments to the
IDEA provide, in pertinent part, as
follows:
If the parents of a child with a
disability who previously
received special education and
related services under the
authority of a public agency,
enroll the child in a private ele-
mentary or secondary school,
without the consent of or referral
by the public agency, a court or
hearing officer may require the
agency to reimburse the parents
for the cost of that enrollment if
the court or hearing officer finds
that the agency has not made a
free appropriate public education
available to the child in a timely
manner prior to that enrollment.
[Italics added.]
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(C)(ii).
The school board argues that
Gilbert’s father is not entitled to
tuition reimbursement under the
IDEA because Gilbert had not previ-
ously received special education
under the authority of a public
agency. According to the school
board, the Second Circuit’s decision
would permit parents who have nev-
er given the local educational agency
an opportunity to provide a free
appropriate public education to their
child to invoke the protections of
the same remedy available to the
parents who have given the public
entity a chance to do so. The school
board says there is no support in the
language of the IDEA or in the leg-
islative history for an interpretation
under which a parent could obtain
tuition reimbursement without ever
trying the public placement. 
The school board contends that
Gilbert has never received special
education and related services
under the authority of a public
school. It says that the development
of an individualized education pro-
(Continued on Page 10)
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gram is not included in the IDEA’s
definitions of special education and
related services. The board reasons
that the IDEA differentiates the ini-
tial evaluation from the provision of
special education and related ser-
vices and that therefore they are
not the same thing.
The school board stresses that the
language of 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) is clear and
should be strictly construed. It says
the district court’s reading of the
statute renders the statutory lan-
guage “previously received special
education and related services” a
nullity and therefore should be
rejected. The school board declares
that both the plain language of the
statute and the IDEA’s legislative
history demonstrate Congress’s
intent that children with disabilities
be educated with nondisabled chil-
dren whenever possible and
Congress’s intent to restrict the
availability of reimbursement for
private school tuition. 
With respect to the Department of
Education’s comments regarding §
1412(a)(1)(C)(ii), the school board
argues that those comments are not
entitled to deference because they
are devoid of analysis. The board
also argues that the comments
ignore the plain language of the
statute.
Finally, the school board says the
language of 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)
(10)(C)(ii) does not provide clear
notice that Congress intended to
impose upon the states the econom-
ic burden of reimbursing parents for
unilaterally placing their children in
private schools. The school board
explains that statutes enacted under
Congress’s Spending Power must be
construed strictly according to the
plain meaning of their terms in
order to avoid burdening the states
with obligations they did not antici-
pate. The school board says the
decision of the Second Circuit in
this case imposes an economic bur-
den, not contemplated by Congress,
upon local schools implementing
the IDEA. The school board con-
cludes that a rule permitting parents
to unilaterally place their children
in private schools, and then seek
tuition reimbursement from the
public entity, stands in contradic-
tion to the plain language of the
statute and the intent of Congress.
Gilbert’s father argues that the plain
language of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)
does not impose a mandatory public
school “try-out” period as a prereq-
uisite for tuition reimbursement. He
claims that, while the board repeat-
edly asserts it is making a “plain
language” argument, it is actually
“fabricating” statutory “require-
ments” out of whole cloth. 
Gilbert’s father contends that 
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) codifies the
tuition remedy in School Committee
of Burlington v. Department of
Education, 471 U.S. 359 (1985). In
Burlington, the Supreme Court held
that children with disabilities are
not required to continue in inade-
quate public school placements
while their parents challenge a
school district’s failure to provide a
free appropriate public education. 
It is the father’s position that the
legislative history does not indicate
that Congress added a public school
“try-out” requirement. He says that
the IDEA does not expressly exclude
reimbursement when special educa-
tion and related services have not
previously been provided. He claims
that the school board “frequently
misrepresent[s] the legislative histo-
ry or cite[s] it out of context.”
The father also says the U.S.
Department of Education has reject-
ed this try-out requirement. He
points out that during the notice-
and-comment rulemaking period
following the 1997 amendments, the
department was asked to clarify
whether it would interpret subsec-
tion (C)(ii) as barring tuition reim-
bursement when a child had not
previously received “special educa-
tion and related services under the
authority of a public agency.” The
father asserts that the department
responded that “hearing officers and
courts retain their authority, recog-
nized in Burlington and [Carter] to
award ‘appropriate’ relief if a public
agency has failed to provide [a free
appropriate public education],
including reimbursement and com-
pensatory services under [§ 1415]
in instances in which the child has
not yet received special education
and related services.”
Yet even if § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) does
require that all children seeking
tuition reimbursement have
received “special education and
related services under the authority
of a public agency,” Gilbert’s father
says Gilbert received such services
from the school board. His father
reasons that children who are evalu-
ated and assessed by school district
personnel as part of the individual-
ized education program procedure
have received special education ser-
vices from a public agency. In addi-
tion, the father argues that, in reim-
bursing Gilbert’s private school
tuition for the 1997–98 and
1998–99 school years, the school
board provided Gilbert with “special
education and related services.” The
father concludes that reading §
1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) to prevent
tuition reimbursement in situations
in which a school district has not
provided a free appropriate public
education violates the purpose of
the IDEA. 
SIGNIFICANCE
In another case before a different
panel of judges, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled
that when a student’s enrollment in
American Bar Association
private school was appropriate for
his needs, the IDEA did not pre-
clude reimbursement although the
student had not previously received
special education and related ser-
vices from public schools. Frank G.
v. Board of Education of Hyde Park,
459 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 2006). As in
the present case, Frank G. involved
a child who had never attended
public school and a school district
that provided an individualized edu-
cation program.
The Eleventh Circuit, in M.M. v.
School Board of Miami-Dade
County, 437 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir.
2006), held that a school district’s
“[s]ole reliance on the fact that [a
child] never attended public school
is legally insufficient to deny reim-
bursement under § 1412(a)(10)
(C)(ii)” because of the broad equi-
table powers of courts and hearing
officers under § 1415. The court
stated that “even when a child has
never enrolled in a public school,
reimbursement is proper if the
School Board [has] failed to offer a
sufficient IEP and in turn, a [free
appropriate public education].”
In Greenland School District v.
Amy N., 358 F.3d 150, 159-60 (1st
Cir. 2004), the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit
observed that “tuition reimburse-
ment is only available for children
who have previously received ‘spe-
cial education and related services’
while in the public school (or per-
haps those who at least timely
requested such services while the
child is in public school.” However,
in that case, the parents removed
their daughter from public school
and placed her in private school
“without ever before raising with
the school officials the issue of spe-
cial education services for [their
daughter].”
The Supreme Court considered two
special education cases in its last
two terms. Declaring that Spending
Clause legislation that attaches con-
ditions to a state’s acceptance of
federal funds must provide clear
notice of conditions, the Court held,
in a 5-4 decision, that a non-attor-
ney expert’s fees for services ren-
dered to prevailing parents in an
IDEA action are not “costs” recover-
able from the state under the IDEA’s
fee-shifting provision. Arlington
Central School District Board of
Education v. Murphy, 126 S.Ct.
2455 (2006). Later, in Winkelman
ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City
School District, 127 S.Ct. 1994
(2007), the Supreme Court held
that because parents enjoy rights
under the IDEA, they are entitled to
prosecute the IDEA claims on their
own behalf. 
Gilbert’s father predicts that adopt-
ing the school board’s interpretation
of the IDEA would leave many chil-
dren who have been denied a free
appropriate public education with
no effective remedy. These would
include students enrolled in both
public and private schools who—in
the school board’s view—have not
previously received special educa-
tion and related services under the
authority of a public agency. He sug-
gests this group includes (1) public
school students whose disabilities
were only recently diagnosed but
whose proposed individualized edu-
cation program for the following
school year does not provide a free
appropriate public education, (2)
public school students who were
promised certain services under an
individualized education program
but who have not received those
services in a timely manner, and (3)
children entering public school for
the first time who were not identi-
fied through the “child find” provi-
sion of the IDEA.
The school board, however, predicts
that adopting the father’s view of
the IDEA would place burdens on
the states that Congress never
meant to impose. The board sug-
gests that its position is consistent
with the emphasis of the IDEA on
cooperation between parents and
school officials.
ATTORNEYS FOR THE
PARTIES
For Board of Education of the City
School District of the City of New
York (Leonard J. Koerner (212)
788-1010)
For Tom F. ex rel. Gilbert F., a
Minor Child (Paul G. Gardephe
(212) 336-2310)
AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Board of Education
of the City School District of the
City of New York
Council of the Great City
Schools and the National
Association of State Directors of
Special Education (Julie Wright
Halbert (202) 394-2427)
National School Boards
Association and American
Association of School
Administrators (Maree F. Sneed
(202) 637-5600)
New York State School Boards
Association (Jay Worona (518) 783-
0200)
U.S. Conference of Mayors,
National League of Cities, National
Association of Counties, National
Conference of State Legislatures,
Council of State Governments,
International City/County
Management Association, and
International Municipal Lawyers
Association (Richard Ruda (202)
434-4850)
In Support of Tom F. ex rel. Gilbert
F.
Autism Speaks (Robert H. Pees
(212) 872-1000)
(Continued on Page 12)
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Counsel of Parent Attorneys and
Advocates and New Jersey Special
Education Practitioners Supporting
Respondent (Ankur J. Gael (202)
756-8000)
International Dyslexia
Association, Inc. (IDA), the New
York Branch of the IDA, NAMI,
Mental Health America, and the
Bazelon Center (Paul M. Smith
(202) 639-6000)
National Disability Rights
Network and the New York Lawyers
Interest as for the Public (Seth
Galanter (202) 887-1500)
United States (Paul D. Clement,
Solicitor General (202) 514-2217)
